Explanation Beyond Causation? New Directions in the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation by Reutlinger, Alexander
  1 
Explanation Beyond Causation? 
New Directions in the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation 
 
Alexander Reutlinger 
 
Abstract. In this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on non-
causal explanations in philosophy of sciences. I will first present examples of 
non-causal explanations in the sciences. Then, I will outline three alternative 
approaches to non-causal explanations – that is, causal reductionism, pluralism 
and monism – and, corresponding to these three approaches, different 
strategies for distinguishing between causal and non-causal explanation. 
Finally, I will raise questions for future research on non-causal explanations. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The question “what is a scientific explanation?” has taken center stage in 
modern philosophy of science, from its beginnings in the early 20th century 
until the present day. For the past three decades, causal accounts of scientific 
explanations have been the dominant view and the detailed philosophical 
analysis of causal explanations, and also of causation itself, have been the 
main focus in the philosophy of scientific explanation. According to causal 
accounts, the sciences explain by identifying the causes of and mechanisms for 
the phenomenon to be explained (see, for instance, Salmon 1984, 1989; 
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Cartwright 1989; Machamer et al. 2000; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008).1 
Familiar examples of causal explanations include mechanistic explanations 
(Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer et al. 2000; for an overview see 
Andersen 2014) and higher-level or macro causal explanations (Cartwright 
1989; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008). 
Nowadays hardly anyone denies the significance and epistemic value 
of causal explanations in the sciences. However, a significant sea change has 
been taking place since the mid 2000s. A growing number of philosophers of 
science have argued that the repertoire of explanatory strategies in the sciences 
is richer than causal accounts suggest, because there are compelling examples 
of scientific explanations whose explanatory power does not derive from 
identifying causes and mechanisms. In other words, there are non-causal 
explanations, or so it is argued. I will present paradigmatic examples of non-
causal scientific in more detail below (Section 2). In the current literature on 
explanations, a view has emerged, according to which there are causal and 
non-causal scientific explanations.  
The existence of non-causal explanations creates a challenge to causal 
accounts. Let me clarify how the challenge arises by distinguishing two 
attitudes towards causal accounts of explanation – the weak and the strong 
attitude. For many proponents of causal accounts, however, it remains unclear 
which of the two attitudes they adopt.  
 
• Strong attitude: Suppose one takes causal accounts to be general 
accounts of scientific explanation. That is, one takes causal accounts to                                                         
1 Lewis (1986) and Skow (2014) advocate a weakened causal account, to 
which I turn in section 2. 
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be a complete response to the question “what is a scientific 
explanation?” and, thereby, endorses the claim that all scientific 
explanations are causal. If one advocates this strong attitude towards 
causal accounts, then convincing examples of non-causal explanations 
are falsifying counterexamples to causal accounts.  
• Weak attitude: Causal accounts are not taken to be general accounts, 
i.e. causal accounts merely cover a subset of all scientific explanation 
(namely, causal explanations). If one adopts this weak attitude, then 
examples of non-causal explanations do not constitute a 
counterexample to causal accounts. Instead non-causal explanations 
demand a philosophical account of non-causal explanations 
complementing an account of causal explanations.  
 
My main point is that, independently of whether one favors the strong or the 
weak attitude towards causal accounts of explanations, the existence of non-
causal explanations in science requires a philosophical response. One has to 
develop a theory of explanation capturing non-causal explanations – either by 
replacing or by complementing causal accounts of explanation. 
The goal of this paper is to present the gist of the exciting new 
literature on non-causal explanations. In the recent literature, the primary goal 
of discussing examples of non-causal explanations has been to undermine or 
challenge the hegemony of causal accounts. The current debate has been 
largely silent on a more positive and constructive approach to non-causal 
explanation. In this paper, I will also advocate the view that in order to 
advance a constructive approach one should address (some of) the questions I 
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will present in this paper.  
Of course, due to space constraints, I will not be able to address some 
deeply interesting issues regarding non-causal explanations, such as whether 
non-causal modes of explaining are superior to garden variety causal 
explanations (Andersen forthcoming), whether there is a special relationship 
that non-causal explanations bear to certain kinds of idealizations (Batterman 
and Rice 2014), and which role the pragmatics of explanation play in the non-
causal case (Potochnik in progress). 
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I will provide an 
overview of the examples motivating the claim that there are non-causal 
explanations. In section 3, I will present three major approaches to non-causal 
explanations (causal reductionism, pluralism, and monism) and, respectively, 
different strategies for distinguishing between causal and non-causal 
explanations. Section 4 will provide an outlook on open research questions.  
 
 
2. Examples of Non-Causal Explanations  
Let me present three prominent examples of non-causal explanations in more 
detail: (1) Lange’s explanation, (2) Euler’s explanation, and (3) 
renormalization group explanations. I will, then, present a more encompassing 
list of examples that are being discussed in the current literature. 
Example 1: Lange’s explanation. Let me start with a simple and instructive 
toy example from Lange’s recent work (Lange 2013: 488). In slight 
modification of the original, the example of a “distinctively mathematical” 
explanation runs as follows: Marc failed when he tried a moment ago to 
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distribute his 23 strawberries evenly among his 3 children – without cutting 
any (neither strawberries nor children). Why did Marc fail to carry out his 
plan? What explains his failure?2 The explanation of this fact involves two 
central assumptions: (I) It is a contingent fact that Marc had 3 children and 23 
strawberries when he started do distribute the strawberries (and that situation 
did not change during the course of his attempt to distribute the strawberries). 
(II) It is a mathematical fact that 23 cannot be divided evenly by 3. Lange’s 
basic non-causal intuition regarding this toy example is that assumptions (I) 
and (II) are non-causal and explanatory.  
 Lange points out that a distinctively mathematical explanation may 
include some causal information. For instance, “Lange’s explanation” 
(presented in the previous paragraph) may include information about which 
beliefs and desires regarding his three children caused Marc to distribute the 
strawberries, information about the proper functioning of physiological causal 
mechanisms of his body and the bodies of his children during the time that the 
distribution of strawberries takes etc. In the context of distinctively 
mathematical explanations, Lange thinks of such causal information as a 
presupposition of the explanation-seeking why-question as follows: 
presupposing that Marc’s beliefs and desires caused him to distribute the 
strawberries and presupposing the proper functioning of physiological 
mechanism of his body and the bodies of his children during the time of the 
                                                        
2 It is not always clear in the literature what the explanandum is. Euler’s 
explanation is taken to address prima facie different explananda: (i) the fact 
that Marc failed in a particular situation, (ii) the fact that everyone who ever 
tried failed to achieve what Marc attempted to do, and (iii) the fact that Marc 
necessarily failed. Similar remarks apply to other examples of non-causal 
explanation such as the following ones. It is an important task for future 
research to disentangle these explananda and to discuss them separately. 
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distribution etc., why did Marc fail to distribute the strawberries evenly? A 
distinctively mathematical explanation is non-causal due to the fact that the 
answer to this why-question derives its explanatory power from mathematical 
facts (and not from a description of causes of the explanandum).  
Example 2: Euler’s explanation. Consider another, less toyish 
example of a non-causal explanation: Euler’s explanation (van Fraassen 1989: 
236-239; Pincock 2012: 51-53; Lange 2013a: 489; Author forthcoming).  
In 1736, Königsberg had four parts of town and seven bridges 
connecting these parts. Interestingly, no one ever succeeded in the attempt to 
cross all of the bridges exactly once. This surprising fact calls for an 
explanation. The explanation is usually attributed to the mathematician 
Leonhard Euler. Euler’s explanation starts with representing relevant aspects 
of Königsberg’s geography with a graph. A simplified geographical map of 
Königsberg in 1736 represents only the four parts of town (the two islands A 
and B, and the two riverbanks C and D) and the seven bridges (part A is 
connected to 5 bridges, parts B, C and D are each connected to 3 bridges). 
This simplified geography of Königsberg can also be represented by a graph, 
in which the nodes represent the parts of town A-D and the edges represent the 
bridges. Given this graph-theoretical representation, Euler defines an Euler 
path as a path through a graph G that includes each edge in G exactly once. 
Euler uses the notion of an Euler path to reformulate the explanandum in 
terms of the question: why has everyone failed to traverse Königsberg on an 
Euler path?  
According to Euler’s explanation, the answer to this why-question has 
two components: 
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1. Euler’s theorem, according to which there is an Euler path through a 
graph G iff G is an Eulerian graph. Euler proved that a graph G is 
Eularian iff (i) all the nodes in G are connected to an even number of 
edges, or (ii) exactly two nodes in G (one of which we take as our 
starting point) are connected to an odd number of edges.  
2. The contingent fact that the actual bridges and parts of Königsberg do 
not have the structure of an Eulerian graph, because conditions (i) and 
(ii) in the definition of an Eulerian graph are not satisfied: no part of 
town (corresponding to the nodes) is connected to an even number of 
bridges (corresponding to the edges), violating condition (i); and more 
than two parts of town (corresponding to the nodes) are connected to 
an odd number of bridges (corresponding to the edges), violating 
condition (ii). Surely, Königsberg could have been isomorphic to an 
Eulerian graph in 1736, but as a matter of contingent fact it was not.  
 
Based on the first and the second component one can conclude that there is no 
Euler path through the Königsberg. This explains why nobody ever succeeded 
in crossing all of the bridges of Königsberg exactly once.  
 Example 3: Renormalization group explanations. A third prominent 
example of non-causal explanations are renormalization group explanations in 
physics. Microscopically different physical systems (such as various liquids, 
gases, and metals) display the same macro-behavior when undergoing phase-
transitions (for instance, transitions from a liquid to a vaporous phase). This 
‘sameness’ or – to use a more technical term – ‘universality’ of the macro-
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behavior is characterized by a critical exponent that takes the same value for 
microscopically very different systems. 
How do physicists explain the remarkable fact that there is universal 
macrobehavior? Renormalization group explanations are intended to provide 
an explanation of why microscopically different physical systems display the 
same macro-behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. However, 
renormalization group explanations do not explain this surprising phenomenon 
by identifying causes and mechanisms, or so several philosophers have 
argued. Instead the explanations crucially rely on limit theorems (e.g. the 
thermodynamic limit), mathematically sophisticated coarse-graining 
procedures (renormalization group transformations), and the determination of 
fixed points. None of these explanatory assumptions identifies causes 
(Batterman 2000, 2002; Reutlinger 2014, forthcoming; Hüttemann et al. 2015; 
Morrison in progress).  
In the current literature, further compelling examples abound. The list 
of examples is taken to include different kinds of ‘purely’ or ‘distinctively’ 
mathematical explanations – such as number-theoretical (Baker 2009), graph-
theoretic (Pincock 2012; Lange 2013a), topological (Huneman 2010; Lange 
2013a), geometric explanations (Lange 2013a), abstract explanations (Pincock 
2012, 2015), structural explanations (Bokulich 2008), and statistical 
explanations (Lipton 2004; Lange 2013b). Other kinds of non-causal 
explanations in physics are explanations based on symmetry principles and 
conservation laws (Lange 2011), kinematic principles (Saatsi 2016), 
renormalization group theory (Batterman 2000; Author 2014, forthcoming, in 
progress; Hüttemann et al. 2015; Morrison in progress), dimensional analysis 
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(Lange 2009a; Pexton 2015), laws of coexistence (Kistler 2013), structural 
explanations in special relativity (Felline 2011; Lange 2013c), variational 
principles (van Fraassen 1989; Reutlinger in progress; French and Saatsi in 
progress), laws of composition (Hüttemann 2004; Lange 2009b), and inter-
theoretic relations (Batterman 2002; Bokulich 2008; Weatherall 2011). 
Furthermore, the recent debate identifies examples of non-causal explanations 
in the special sciences, such as in neuroscience (Chirimuuta 2014, in 
progress), in the earth sciences (Bokulich in progress), and in the sciences of 
complex systems (Morrison in progress).3 
 
 
3. Three Approaches to Non-Causal Explanations: Causal 
Reductionism, Pluralism, and Monism  
As already pointed out above, the recent literature has been mostly engaged 
with drawing attention to a number of examples of scientific explanations that 
do not explain by virtue of referring to causes. Although this work is clearly of 
great importance, it is another pressing question of how one should 
philosophically respond to the mentioned examples of causal and non-causal 
explanations. I propose to disentangle three strategies for responding to the 
apparent existence of examples of non-causal explanations: (a) causal 
reductionism, (b) pluralism, and (c) monism.  
(a) Causal reductionism, i.e. the view that there are no non-causal 
explanations, because seemingly non-causal explanations can ultimately be                                                         
3 See Hempel (1965), Van Fraassen (1980), Achinstein (1983), and Kitcher 
(1989) for pioneering work on non-causal explanations from the ‘classic’ 
literature on scientific explanations.  
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understood as causal explanations. Lewis (1986) and, more recently, Skow 
(2014) have presented one prominent attempt for spelling out this strategy. 
The causal accounts I have referred to earlier require identifying the causes of 
the explanandum. However, Lewis and Skow have weakened the causal 
account by requiring only that a causal explanation provide some information 
about the causal history of the explanandum. Lewis’ and Skow’s notion of 
information is significantly broader than the notion of identifying causes. For 
instance, Lewis and Skow hold that one causally explains by merely excluding 
a possible causal history of the explanandum E, or by stating that E has no 
cause at all, while other causal accounts would not classify this sort of 
information as causally explanatory. Lewis and Skow defend the claim that 
allegedly non-causal explanations (at least, of events, as Skow remarks) turn 
out to be causal explanations, if one adopts their weakened account of causal 
explanation. The upshot of their approach is that one has to neither entirely 
replace (but rather weaken) nor complement the causal account of explanation.   
Strevens (in progress) develops arguments in a (partially) reductionist 
spirit. That is, although he is not necessarily opposed to non-causal 
explanation in science (and, although Strevens accepts non-causal 
explanations in pure mathematics and the moral domain), he argues that at 
least some central examples of allegedly non-causal scientific explanations 
(such as Euler’s explanation and equilibrium explanations) can be interpreted 
as causal explanations, if one adopts the right causal account of explanations. 
Strevens has in mind causal accounts, according to which causal explanations 
do not only identify causes but also abstract away from irrelevant causal 
details (Strevens 2008). According to this approach, Euler’s explanation, for 
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instance, identifies the causes of the explanandum and abstracts away from 
irrelevant causal details when representing Königsberg as instantiating a non-
Eulerian graph.  
(b) Pluralism, i.e., roughly put, the view that causal and non-causal 
explanations are covered by two (or more) distinct theories of explanation. 
The core idea of a pluralist response to the existence of examples of causal and 
non-causal explanations is that causal accounts of explanations have to be 
supplemented with an account (or several accounts) of non-causal 
explanations.  
For adopting pluralism, as I define it here, it is, however, not sufficient 
to merely acknowledge that there are two or more types of explanation – such 
as causal and non-causal types of explanation. Monists also accept that there 
are different types of explanations (see below). More precisely, a pluralist 
holds that (1) there are different types of explanations (in particular, causal 
and non-causal explanations), (2) there is no single theory that captures all 
causal and non-causal explanations, and (3) one needs two (or more) distinct 
theories of explanation to adequately capture all causal and non-causal 
explanations.  
Pluralist strategies may take different forms and strengths. In order to 
understand what form a pluralist approach to causal and non-causal 
explanations may take, consider two instructive historical examples before I 
turn to the current literature.  
First, van Fraassen (1980: 131) holds that there are different types of 
explanation: causal and non-causal explanations (relying on different causal 
and non-causal relevance relations). Van Fraassen adopts a pluralist stance to 
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the extent that he takes causal and non-causal explanations refer to different 
non-causal and causal relevance relations and no single overarching and more 
general story about what makes these different relevance relations explanatory 
can be told. (Van Fraassen’s critics argue that pointing out that both kinds of 
explanations can be reconstructed as answers to why-questions is not 
informative enough to count as a satisfactory overarching and more general 
theory, see Kitcher and Salmon 1987.) That is, van Fraassen adopts at least the 
conditions (1) and (2) of pluralism (as introduced above). 
Second, Salmon’s claim about the “peaceful coexistence” of the 
“ontic” causal account and the “epistemic” unification account seems to be 
another, slightly different instance of pluralism. Some phenomenon may have 
two kinds of explanation: a causal “bottom-up” explanation and a 
unificationist “top-down” explanation (illustrated by the example of the 
“friendly physicist”, Salmon 1989: 183). This is a kind of pluralism because 
there is no single overarching theory telling us what makes these two kinds of 
explanation explanatory (Salmon 1989: 184-185).4 Instead, a pluralist of this 
sort relies on two different theories of explanation (a causal account and a 
unificationist account) to cover all causal and non-causal explanations. In 
other words, Salmon embraces a kind of pluralism that satisfies all of the three 
conditions above. 
The perhaps most prominent heir of Salmon’s and van Fraassen’s                                                         
4 Salmon’s story about the friendly physicist also has another intended upshot: 
one may have a causal and a non-causal explanation for the same phenomenon 
and both explanations are equally valuable. This is also a form of pluralism (or 
relativism). However, for present concerns, I am exclusively interested in 
pluralism as defined above. Pluralism, if understood in this way, is compatible 
with (but does not imply) the view that one phenomenon has a causal and an 
equally valuable non-causal explanation. See Pincock (in progress) for 
instructive definitions of different kinds of pluralism. 
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pluralist approaches in the recent debate on non-causal explanations seems to 
be Lange’s account of “explanation by constraint” (Lange 2011, 2013, in 
progress; for an alternative pluralist framework, see Pincock in progress). 
Lange (2013: 509-510) explicitly refers to Salmon’s distinction between 
“ontic” causal and “modal” theories of scientific explanation. Adopting a 
modal account, Lange argues that many non-causal explanations operate by 
showing what constrains the explanandum phenomenon. “Constraining”, in 
this context, amounts to showing why the explanandum had to occur. Lange 
characterizes his modal approach to “distinctively mathematical” and (some) 
other non-causal explanations as follows: 
 
“Ultimately, I argue that these explanations explain not by 
describing the world’s causal structure, but roughly by revealing 
that the explanandum is more necessary than ordinary causal 
laws are. The Königsberg bridges as so arranged were never 
crossed because they cannot be crossed. Mother’s strawberries 
were not distributed evenly among her children because they 
cannot be.” (Lange 2013: 491) 
 
What does this “cannot” amount to? Lange proposes to explicate his modal 
account in terms of different strengths of necessities:  
 
“These necessities are stronger than causal necessity, setting 
distinctively mathematical explanations apart from ordinary 
scientific explanations. Distinctively mathematical explanations 
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in science work by appealing to facts […] that are modally 
stronger than ordinary causal laws […].” (Lange 2013: 491) 
 
The modal approach provides Lange with a prima facie helpful criterion to 
distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations in terms of modal 
strength: an explanation is non-causal if its explanatory principles refer to 
“necessities [that] are stronger than causal necessity” (Lange 2013: 491).  
Lange is a pluralist, because he agrees with Salmon that (1) some 
explanations fall under the “ontic” causal account, while some (but not 
necessarily all) non-causal explanations are subsumed under the “modal” 
account, and (2) there is no overarching, more general account of explanation 
covering all of these explanations. Lange summarizes: “I have argued that the 
modal conception, properly elaborated, applies at least to distinctively 
mathematical explanation in science, whereas the ontic conception does not.” 
(Lange 2013: 509-510) This, I take it, is an instance of pluralism.   
(c) Monism, i.e. the view that there is one single philosophical account 
capturing both causal and non-causal explanations. A monist holds that causal 
and non-causal explanations share a feature that makes them explanatory. 
Unlike the causal reductionist, the monist does not deny the existence of non-
causal explanations. The monist disagrees with the pluralist, because the 
former wishes to replace the causal account with some monist account, while 
the latter merely wants to supplement the causal account.  
 What might a monist account look like? Hempel’s covering-law 
account may serve as an instructive historical example for illustrating monism 
(Hempel 1965: 352). Hempel argues that causal and non-causal explanations 
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are explanatory by virtue of having one single feature in common: nomic 
expectability. In the case of causal explanations, one expects the explanandum 
to occur on the basis of causal covering laws (laws of succession) and intitial 
conditions; in the non-causal case, one’s expectations are based on non-causal 
covering laws (laws of coexistence) and initial conditions. However, 
Hempelian monism is unfortunately not the most attractive option for monists, 
because the covering-law account suffers from well-known problems (Salmon 
1989: 46-50).5  
In the current debate, it is an open question whether there is a viable 
monist alternative to Hempelian monism (Lipton 2004: 32). The perhaps most 
promising and the most elaborate recent attempt to make progress on a monist 
approach are counterfactual theories of causal and non-causal explanations. 
Proponents of the counterfactual theory have articulated and explored this 
approach in application to various examples of non-causal explanations 
(Frisch 1998; Bokulich 2008; Kistler 2013; Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Pexton 
2014; Pincock 2015; Rice 2015; Reutlinger forthcoming, in progress; Saatsi 
2016; French and Saatsi in progress; Woodward in progress). 
Counterfactual theories take Woodward’s counterfactual account of 
causal explanations as their starting point: 
 
“An explanation ought to be such that it enables us to see what 
sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the 
                                                        
5 Similarly, unificationist theories of explanation are intended to capture both 
causal and non-causal explanations in science and in pure mathematics 
(Kitcher 1984; 1989). However, unificationist theories also face well-known 
problems especially in the context of causal explanations (Woodward 2014: 
sect. 5). 
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factors cited in the explanans had been different in various 
possible ways.” (Woodward 2003: 11) 
 
“Explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of 
counterfactual dependence.” (Woodward 2003: 191) 
 
Woodward’s version of the counterfactual theories of explanation and its 
underlying interventionist theory of causation is originally intended to capture 
causal explanations (Woodward 2003: 203). However, the core idea of the 
counterfactual theory – that is, understanding explanatory relevance in terms 
of counterfactual dependence – is not necessarily tied to a causal 
interpretation. Woodward suggests this line of argument, although without 
pursuing this intriguing idea any further (but see Woodward in progress): 
 
“[T]he common element in many forms of explanation, both 
causal and non-causal, is that they must answer what-if-things-
had-been-different questions.” (Woodward 2003: 221). 
 
To answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions is nothing but 
revealing what sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum if 
the factors cited in the explanans had been different in various possible ways. 
Hence, the monist proposal of counterfactuals theories is that causal and non-
causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of exhibiting how the 
explanandum counterfactually depends on the explanans.  
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 Within the framework of counterfactual theories, it is, of course, still 
possible to distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations. Non-
causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of exhibiting non-causal 
counterfactual dependencies; causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of 
exhibiting causal counterfactual dependencies. Proponents of the 
counterfactual theory propose different strategies for drawing a distinction 
between causal and non-causal counterfactual dependencies.  
 According to one proposal, the causal counterfactual dependencies are 
expressed by interventionist counterfactuals, while non-causal counterfactual 
dependencies cannot be phrased in terms of interventionist counterfactuals: 
“When a theory or derivation answers a what-if-things-had-been different 
question but we cannot interpret this as an answer to a question about what 
would happen under an intervention, we may have a non-causal explanation of 
some sort.” (Woodward 2003: 221; see Woodward in progress).  
 According to another proposal, the distinction between causal and non-
causal counterfactuals is drawn in a way that does not depend on the 
interventionist approach to causation. Instead the key idea is that causal 
counterfactual dependencies display features that are, typically and more 
generally, associated with cause-effect relationships. Such features include 
asymmetry, time-asymmetry, metaphysical distinctness of the relata, and so on 
(Kistler 2013; Pexton and Saatsi 2014; Saatsi forthcoming; Reutlinger 2014, 
forthcoming, in progress). If one adopts this strategy, non-causal 
counterfactual dependencies are taken to lack one or more of the features 
typically associated with causation.  
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 Pincock (2012, 2015) introduces a third way to distinguish between 
causal and non-causal counterfactuals. The former express information about 
counterfactual dependence, i.e. these counterfactuals state that the effect 
would change if one counterfactually changed the purported cause. The latter 
express information about counterfactual independence: that is, the non-
causally explanatory counterfactuals state that certain explanatory facts (or 
factors) would remain the same if one counterfactually changed the micro-
constitution of the system whose behavior is supposed to be explained (see 
also Batterman and Rice 2014).6 
   
4. Open Questions for Future Research 
Since the debate on non-causal explanations in its current form is a fairly 
young field and no established literature, (luckily) no ‘received view’, has 
emerged yet, I will use this section to articulate three potentially fruitful 
questions for future research. 
 
(1) How does one adequately distinguish between causal and non-causal                                                         6 Strevens explores an alternative monist approach. Strevens has argued for 
extending the notion of difference-making figuring in his kairetic account of 
explanation from causal to non-causal explanations (Strevens 2008: 177-180). 
However, Strevens’ monism has a different scope than the monism advocated 
by proponents of the counterfactual account. Although Strevens argues for 
causal reductionism with respect to some allegedly non-causal scientific 
explanations, he holds that there are extra-scientific non-causal explanations 
(such as explanations in pure mathematics, moral explanations, and 
metaphysical explanations). If one extends the kairetic account from causal 
scientific to non-causal extra-scientific explanations, then the central notion of 
difference-making is based on, for instance, moral and mathematical 
dependence relations. Interestingly, Strevens’ view also has pluralist aspects, 
because the causal, moral, and mathematical dependence relations figuring in 
scientific, moral, and mathematical explanations are taken as primitives. I 
believe Strevens’ interesting approach deserves more attention. 
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explanations? 
Causal reductionism, pluralism and monism suggest different strategies for 
characterizing causal explanations and for distinguishing causal and non-
causal explanations. But are these proposals convincing?  
Lewis’ and Skow’s weakened causal account comes with a price, since 
their notion of “information” is at odds with major theories of causation and of 
causal explanation. Consider one example. Major theories of causation (such 
as regularity theories, probabilistic theories, process theories, counterfactual 
and interventionist theories) and causal accounts of explanations (see 
introduction) do not count merely excluding a possible cause of the 
explanandum (Skow’s example) as a causal statement or as causally 
explanatory. According to major theories of causation and causal accounts of 
explanation, causal (and causally explanatory) statements are about the actual 
type-level or token-level (deterministic or probabilistic) cause(s) of the 
explanandum phenomenon. If there is such a tension with major theories of 
causation and causal explanation, is the price for adopting causal reductionism 
not too high?  
According to Lange’s modal account, the non-causal character of an 
explanation is determined by the modal character of its central explanatory 
assumptions. However, the distinction between explanations that are 
distinctively mathematical and those that are not does not only seem to be 
non-sharp (Lange 2013a: 507) but almost arbitrary. To see why consider any 
scientific explanation formulated in the language of mathematics (see also 
Pincock 2015). Why is it not always possible to take that explanation and turn 
it into a distinctively mathematical explanation by (a) shifting the underlying 
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mathematical axioms and theorems in the foreground of the explanation, and 
by (b) transferring the causal and nomological information into the 
background, the context, or the presupposition of the explanation-seeking 
why-question? If such arbitrary shifts are not possible, is this a matter of 
pragmatics and the conversational context of the explanations at hand? Is the 
distinctively mathematical character of an explanation a pragmatic and 
context-dependent feature after all (as Lange seems to suggest, Lange 2013a: 
507)?  
Monists accepting the counterfactual theory of explanations seem to be 
committed to an interventionist, or a broadly counterfactual, theory of 
causation. Is this not a problem for the scope and applicability of this monist 
approach? Not everyone might wish to adopt such a theory of causation. For 
instance, anti-Humeans about causation may not be able to accept the 
counterfactual theory of explanations, because they reject counterfactual 
accounts of causation. Moreover, how convincing are the monist aspirations 
for the counterfactual theory? Is it really possible to extend the counterfactual 
theory to all sorts of non-causal (scientific) explanations? If symmetry 
principles or theories are explanatory, does it make sense to endorse 
counterfactual claims about what would be the case if the symmetry principles 
or the some particular theory were not to hold (French and Saatsi in progress)? 
 
(2) Can pluralists and monists avoid the problems of the covering-law 
account? 
The popularity of causal accounts of explanation has been mainly due to the 
fact that they successfully meet desiderata that are not satisfied by previously 
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proposed alternative accounts of explanation – most importantly, the covering-
law account (Hempel 1965). Famously, the covering-law account fails, among 
other issues, to identify (a) some explanatory asymmetries, and (b) the 
distinction between explanatorily relevant and irrelevant factors. Causal 
accounts meet these desiderata in a natural way. If explaining consists in 
identifying causes, then the explanatory asymmetry holds in virtue of the 
asymmetry of cause-effect relationships; and identifying explanatorily relevant 
factors amounts to identifying the causes of the explanandum phenomenon, 
while irrelevant factors are not causes.  
However, both monists and pluralists accept that there are some 
explanations that do not explain by identifying causes. The question arises 
whether and how monists and pluralists can avoid the problems of the 
covering law account – in the context of non-causal explanations – without 
referring to causes. It is a major task for future research to show that accounts 
of non-causal explanations can successfully deal with the problems troubling 
the covering-law account. 
 
(3) Do theories of non-causal explanation in the sciences extend to non-
causal explanations in other domains? 
Currently, one finds a strikingly common theme in philosophy of science, 
philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics: an increasing attention to non-
causal explanations. In addition to non-causal explanations in the sciences, 
there seem to be plausible instances of non-causal explanations in pure 
mathematics and in metaphysics. Philosophers of mathematics and 
mathematicians distinguish between non-causally explanatory and non-
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explanatory proofs in pure mathematics (Mancosu 2015; Colyvan et al. in 
progress). Metaphysicians adopt the view that if A-facts ground B-facts, then 
the A-facts explain non-causally why B-facts obtain (Reutlinger forthcoming; 
Jansson in progress). It is a challenging task for future research on non-causal 
explanations to explore how non-causal ways of explaining in science, 
mathematics and philosophy interrelate. This project is also a great 
opportunity for philosophers of science to interact with neighboring field in 
philosophy. 
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